Syria And The United States: Eisenhower’s Cold War In The Middle East

The "Syrian crisis" of 1957, sparked by a covert attempt by the Eisenhower administration to overthrow what it perceived to be an emerging Soviet client-state in the Middle East, represented the denouement of a badly misguided U.S. foreign policy, according to David Lesch. The repercussions of this incident, which almost precipitated a superpower confrontation, made glaringly obvious the pitfalls of a Middle East policy so obsessed with the "Soviet threat" that it precluded a reasoned analysis of the complex dynamics of the region.
Focusing on regional politics and utilizing newly available primary documentation, Syria and the United States offers a multi-dimensional analysis of Syrian-American relations during the Eisenhower years and presents a new interpretation of the "Syrian crisis" and the evolution of U.S. foreign policy that led to it. In addition, Lesch offers important new insight into the roles played by Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and the United Nations as well as a thorough examination of the Syrian political scene. The implications of the past for the present, Lesch emphasizes, should not go unremarked in light of current events - and Syria's pivotal role in them - in the Middle East.