Negative Actions. Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency

Negative Actions (intentional Omissions, Refrainments, Etc.) Seem To Be Genuine Actions. The Standard Metaphysical Theories Of Action Are Event-based: They Treat Actions As Events Of A Special Kind. But It Seems That Many (and Perhaps All) Negative Actions Are, Not Events, But Absences Thereof. In This Book, I Provide A Comprehensive Treatment Of This Problem And Its Solution. I Trace The Appearance That Negative Actions Are Mere Absences To The Widely-assumed View That Negative Action Sentences (sentences Which Describe An Agent As Omitting, Refraining, Etc.) Are Negative Existentials, Reporting The Non-occurrence Of An Event Of A Certain Kind. I Argue, On The Contrary, That Such Sentences Report The Occurrence Of An Event, Not The Absence Of One. Moreover, I Show How These Events Can Be Identified With Ordinary, Positive Events Of The Sort We Should Already Have In Our Ontology. In Developing These Views, I Provide A Comprehensive Picture Of The Metaphysics Of Negative Actions, The Nature Of Our Thought And Talk About Them, And Their Place In A Theory Of Action And Agency-- Provided By Publisher.