New Advances in Causation, Agency and Moral Responsibility

This Volume Brings Together A Number Of Previously Unpublished Essays That Will Advance The Reader’s Philosophical Understanding Of Specific Aspects Of Causation, Agency And Moral Responsibility. These Are Deeply Intertwined Notions, And A Large Proportion Of The Volume Is Taken Up By Papers That Shed Light On Their Mutual Connections Or Defend Certain Claims Concerning Them. The Volume Investigates Several Important Questions, Including: Can Causation Be Perceived? If It Can, Can It Be Perceived In Any Way Other Than Visually? Can The Interventionist Theory Developed By James Woodward Offer An Adequate Account Of Causation? Is A Causal Relation A Necessary Condition For Moral Responsibility? Can There Be A Responsibility Difference Without A Causal Difference? Are Causal Ascriptions Based On The More Primitive Language Game Of Blame Ascriptions? What Can Be Learnt From The Analogy Between Causal Interference And Unbreakable Processes, On One Side, And Motivational Interferences And “unbreakable” Resolutions, On The Other Side? How Can Humans Be Routinely Considered Responsible For Non-deliberated Omissions? Should The Connection Between Moral Responsibility And The Epistemic Conditions Usually Required For Moral Responsibility To Be Obtained Be Weakened? What Is The Connection Between Awareness Of One’s Doing And Intentional Action?