The Risk of Brexit: The Politics of a Referendum

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved. The Risk of BrexitThe Politics of a ReferendumBy Roger LiddleRowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.Copyright © 2016 Policy NetworkAll rights reserved.ISBN: 978-1-78348-856-8ContentsAbout the Author, Preface, HOW WE GOT HERE, 1 The Remorseless Logic of Conservative Division on Europe, 2 The Shifting Renegotiation Agenda, GEARING UP FOR THE RENEGOTIATION, 3 The Impact of the 2015 General Election on the European Question, 4 Will Britain's EU Partners Deliver What Cameron Needs?, 5 What Does Cameron Actually Want?, THE RENEGOTIATION AGENDA, 6 No Longer Part of 'Ever-closer' Union?, 7 Fair Treatment Between the 'Euro-ins' and 'Euro-outs', 8 A New Deal on Migration, 9 A More Competitive EU, PROSPECTS FOR THE REFERENDUM AND THEREAFTER, 10 The Conservative Politics of the Referendum, 11 Corbyn and Europe, 12 Can Cameron Win a Vote to Remain?, 13 Will the Referendum Resolve Britain's Europe Dilemma?, CHAPTER 1THE REMORSELESS LOGIC OF CONSERVATIVE DIVISION ON EUROPEThe promise of an in-out referendum on Britain's EU membership was something that David Cameron never wanted to make. When he ran for the Conservative leadership in 2005 a central part of his analysis of why the Conservatives had lost three successive general elections was their perceived obsession with Europe. In his first speech as leader to a Conservative conference in October 2006, he could not have been more emphatic:Instead of talking about the things most people care about, we talked about what we cared about most. While parents worried about childcare, getting the kids to school, balancing work and family life – we were banging on about Europe.Since going into opposition in 1997, the Conservatives had struck highly Eurosceptic positions, opposing the ratification of every single one of the four European treaties that the Labour government signed and making the commitment that under the Conservatives, Britain would "never" join the euro. Cameron's objection was not apparently to the substance of these positions, but to the priority the Conservatives had given them in their campaigning and public image. On the issue of substance, no one quite knew where he stood. No one imagined he was a pro-European enthusiast. As a young man, he had joined Conservative central office in the late 1980s at a point when Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech had set a new, more sceptical tone. He then worked as a special adviser for Norman Lamont and Michael Howard, both leading Eurosceptics. Yet for all that, it is difficult to believe that someone of his naturally conservative disposition, rooted in his comfortable stockbroker background in the Berkshire countryside, would see his place in history as leading Britain out of the European Union.The Conservatives still stood on the ground defined by both parts of the slogan that William Hague had coined in 1999, "in Europe, not run by Europe". No one disputed that there existed within their ranks what was often dismissed as a strong anti-European 'fringe'. However, the 'fringe' now penetrated to the 'core' with the cabinet itself containing a significant number of hardcore sceptics. At the height of the euro crisis in 2011–12, James Forsyth, the respected Spectator columnist, estimated that nine Conservative cabinet members were perfectly relaxed about the possibility of UK withdrawal.Cameron himself presented an ambiguous stance. On becoming prime minister in 2010, Cameron refused to go back on the pledge he had made in his 2005 leadership campaign to withdraw Conservative MEPs from the European People's party (EPP) group in the European parliament. Instead they formed the European Conservatives and Reformists grouping (ECR) of anti-integrationist MEPs, along with the Polish Law and Justice party and others from mainly small eastern European parties, among whose number were members with an unsavoury antisemitic and homophobic past. Cameron had made his pledge on the EPP under