Philosophy and public policy

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Philosophy and Public Policy
By Andrew I. Cohen Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd.Copyright © 2018 Andrew I. Cohen
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-78660-523-8


Contents
Acknowledgments, ix,
Introduction Andrew I. Cohen, xi,
PART I: RULE OF LAW: APPLICATIONS AND EXEMPTIONS, 1,
1 Moral Reasoning and the Death Penalty Claire Finkelstein, 3,
2 Philosophy, Prostitution, and Policy Robert K. Fullinwider, 19,
3 Bulk Collection, Intrusion, and Domination Tom Sorell, 39,
4 A Public Reason Approach to Religious Exemptions Chad Van Schoelandt, 61,
PART II: TOPICS ON PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC GOODS, 79,
5 Acceptable Risk of Extinction in the Context of Endangered Species Policy John A. Vucetich and Michael Paul Nelson, 81,
6 Public Goods and Education Jonathan Anomaly, 105,
7 Ethical Issues in Academic/Industrial Collaborations David B. Resnik, 121,
8 "Pervasive" Biomedical Technologies: Implications for Ethics and Policymaking Roberta M. Berry, 137,
PART III: PUBLIC POLICIES SHAPING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IDENTITIES, 157,
9 Immigration in Philosophy and in Policy Michael Blake, 159,
10 Toward an Ethics of Political Apology Andrew I. Cohen, 179,
11 Parenting, Philosophy, Public Policy, and a Puzzle: "Good Enough" Parents, Sure, but Why the Requirement That Parents Be Two People in Love? Samantha Brennan, 199,
12 Disability, Identity Justice, and the Politics of Nondiscrimination Anita Silvers and Leslie P. Francis, 215,
Index, 235,
About the Contributors, 242,

CHAPTER 1
Moral Reasoning and the Death Penalty
Claire Finkelstein

TWO ASPECTS OF FAIRNESS IN SENTENCING
For many years the U.S. Supreme Court struggled to reconcile two conflicting arguments in death penalty litigation, arguments that have generated two lines of cases that stand in sharp opposition to one another. The first line says that the assignment of the death penalty should not be arbitrary: which cases receive the death penalty and which do not should be predictable, fair, and consistent with substantive norms of justice. According to this way of thinking, the death penalty can be fairly imposed only when dictated by clear, well-publicized, and consistently administered rules. Among other things, the open-ended nature of the permissible jury discretion in some state schemes was found to invite racial discrimination to play a significant role in determining who from among the many death-eligible defendants actually receive the penalty of death.
As Justice Potter Stewart concluded in 1972 in the case of Furman v. Georgia, which struck down Georgia's unguided discretion statutes:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to death, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. ... But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side. I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. (Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 [1972]) Furman established that the unguided discretion statutes of many American jurisdictions were constitutionally unacceptable, in view of the door they opened for racial discrimination. The result was the requirement that death penalty statutes enumerate a series of "aggravating" factors to be identified before the imposition of a death sentence in order to ensure consistency across cases and the exclusion of constitutionally impermissible factors such as race, and that the death penalty canno